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398 K~mLL V. CITY OF Los ANGELES ,[21 C.2d 
,ficials in, the fire department that petitioner's responsibilities 
required _the exercise ofjudgmeni and" discretion and " that 
,her duties were essential too the conduGt oJ the fire prevention 
activities of the department. The trial court concluded,how-
ever, that petitioner was not a member of the, fire department, 
, entitled to share in the pension plan, because her duties were 
clerical in nature and did not impose any duty OIl her to 
pr~vent or extinguish fires in the city of Los Angeles. _ , 
Pe~itioner -contends on appeal that the construction of se¢-
,tion 185 advocated by defendants, and followed by , the ,t:rial 
court" is, ,erroneous. Defendants-urged that the language 
,of section 185 should be construed so, as to, confer pension 
:b~nefits upon only' those employees of the fire department 
c,who engage directly in the physical task of extinguishing and 
.preventing fires. This restricted interpretation of the lan~ 
gUageOf secti(JD 18G ;wa$ rejected in McKeagv. Board of Pen-
,sion 'Cornrnrs., supra, in which it was held that an that is 
'required under the lang:uage of thecharte;r is that the em-
ployee's dutie$have a substl).ntial connection, either direct or 
indirE;l<lt, with the prevention or extinguishing of fires. We 
think it is, cl~ar in the present case, that the trial court de-
t~rmined p<:ltition.er's claim to membership in the fire depart~ 
;,m~Il~ under an erroneous view of the charter provision which 
requires & reversal of the judgment. , ,,' , ' 
This conclusion is not!'tlteredby the fact that Ordinance 
No. 71513, a departmental salary ordinanCe whichtiildettoQk 
to 'segregate ~he e~ployees of the: fire departniellt intO i. pen-
sion" and "llon~pensioll" groups, classified petitioner as" a 
non-pensio.nemployee. (See, ,also, Ordinance No. 79867.) 
As was pointed out in McKeag v. Board of Pension Oornmrs., 
supra, the charterproyision specifically" provjdes that the 
right toa pellilion is to be determinedin.deVendently of the 
desigllationlinderwhich persons may be describedlD any'$al~ 
ary or depa~tmehta.l, ordinance., (§ 185.) "Furthermore, the 
attempt of tM city council or the 'Board of PeIlsionCommis-
'sioners to ,determIne th.esta tus 'of particular ' employees, while 
necessary in ,t,l:te"adrilini$tration of tl1e affairs -of the depal',t-
ment, is not controllIng inv.iew of tbeprovisioflSO{ the 
charter. (See McKeag v. Board 0/ Pe~siO'n Commrs.,ante, 
p. 386 [132 P.2d 198].) '. .... .,' 
There is no dispute asfo the f~cts of petitionel"semploY'-
ment in this case. The findings of the trial court. and -undis-
. puted testimony in the record illustrate c~early thatpeti-
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tioncrJs dtities.had a substaniill! conn~,ction with the fire pr~ ventio~a~Hvities of the firedep'artmen.t: Under the :test, 
laid dbwniu the charter, therefore, petItIoner ""llSen~I~~ed, 
toshar~ in the provisions of the pension pia:.; as a ~ember 
of the department all;d the trial court erred In den:ymg the 
relief sought. . 
The judgment is reversed. 
: Shenk,J., Curtis,J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J., Traynor, J.; 
and Spence, J. pro tem., concurred; .... 
Respondents' . petition for a rehearing was deniedJ anuary· . 
18,'1943. . . 
[L. A. No. 17829. In Bank. Dec. 23,1942.], 
SAMUEL H~ HOYT et al.,.Appellants, v; BOARD OF C~VIL 
SERVICE COMMISSIONERS OF THE CITY OF LOS 
. ANGELES et aI., Responderits. 
,.la~lcl Judgments - Declaratory J lldgments --~g~in~. . Whom 
ActilJn' Lies.~Code Civ~·:Proc.,§ 1060, allthonz~~. ~ny p~r­
son" to sue for a declaration of his rights or dll~ies~lth resp~ct 
t~ "apother," appl~es so a~ ~o auth0r.u~~actions ~g,iii:st munt~: i:pa~ j3orporations' and. pohhc,alsubdlV1s1ons of. the .s.~ate.. 'rhe. 
statute. deals with proceaure only; and where anacceJltanoo. of 
ii~bilityand subjection to S1lit on the part, of the ,sovermgn 
body 'are fottndelsewhere in the statute, and where.t~e cieelara-, 
'. tory Judgment procedure. is, not ~arr.ed 'by .the. pr?V,l~l<lns,?f,tpe' 
waiver of immunity, the determmahon.oftheJe,gal;lssll;elnth.~i 
. action:' for ·declaratory relief does :not, jmJltUr governptent&l sov .. · 
ereigitty .. (Ov~rrulin:g:sayshore I:lanit~ Dis~rict v~ Sa:n ~a~eo, 
Q6unty;,48 Oal.:App.~d 337, 119 P.2d 75~;Ir~me.,v,Sacramellto, 
c" etc. Drainage District, 4;9 Cal.ApJl.2d 707,122 P.2d 320.) .• , 
[2] Statut~s"':':O,peration-:-Againstl;ltat~' or Agenc~.~Wh,cre no 
inipairinent' of sovereign powe~s would result, the. LCgIslature 
may properly be .held,to have mtendedtl).at. a statute aPfly.to 
. ' , ..: . 
[21~~e '23Qal.Jur. 625; 25 :a..q.L~ 78~ •. ' .' '.' . , .' 
McK. Dig. ·References: [1] Judgttients, § 9(1) ': ~2] .~tatutes, 
§ 20; [3] Statutes,'§ 180(1);' [4] -Municipal CorporatlOns,§ 295. 
.':<, 
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governmental bodies even tho~gh it, uses general statutory lan-guage only., ' 
'[8]i:d.-~onstruction-Judicial Co:nstruction.~The practical eon-
structIon of a ·statute as indicated by deci$ions of District 
. C~urts of Appeal covering many years is entitled to eonsider-
atIon by the Supreme Court, and should not be overturned un-
less clearly unsupportable. 
[4] MuniCiPalCor~~rationS-CiVjl Servic~Reserve ,List.-'-U nder 
a charter prOVISIon (Los Angeles Charter '§ 125(b)) 'd' for r t' . " ' ',proVl mg 
. a reserv: IS contall~.ing the names of persons suspended 
smce a specIfied date prIor to the charter's' effective date for 
causes other than ~ers.onal delinquency, providing for plaeing 
of names on such hst on request of persons who served since 
such date, and providing that "after this, section takes effect 
the name of any person, except as ,in this section provided for' 
who hns been out of the service, of the city for more than fiv~ 
years" s~all be permanently stricken from the reserve list,'; the 
court wil~follow a ~epartmental construction that the name of 
a person ~s too be stricken 'when he has been out of the city em. 
ploy. for five ye~rs, although he was suspended since the date 
specIfied but ~rIOr to' the' operative date of the charter, ,since 
such constructIOn cannot be said to be clearly erroneous. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Supcrior Court of Los 
Angeles County. CharlesS. Burnell,. Judge. Affirmed. 
Action for declaration of rights under charter proVISo . It' t'il . IOn 
re a mg 0 ClV serVIce reserve list. Judgment for defendants 
affirmed. 
Arthur Lasher for Appellants. 
JosephT. Curley and Marvin C. Hix, as Amici Curiae on 
behalf of Appellants. ' 
~ay L. ~hesebro, City Attorney, Frederick von Schrader 
ASSIstant CIty Attorney, and George William Adams M ,', Che b 'd L . A' , arVIn 
se 1'0, an OUlS • Babior, Deputies City Attorney f Respondents. . , or 
~IBSO~, ? J.-This is an action for declaratory relief in 
WhICh plamtIffs s~ught a construction of section 125 (b) of 
the Los Angeles CIty Charter. Plaintiffs appeal from a" d 
ment rendered against them in the trial ,Court. JU g-
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'~: , 
[ia] In support of the trial court's judgment intheit, 
favor, defendants' contend that an action fox: declar~toTy re:- i 
liefls not availabie against a municipal corporation: in this ,i 
state. For this proposition they rely upon the rece,nt, c~ses()f 
ll'ayshoreSan. Dist. v; San Mateo Oounty,48 Cal,~p'p .. 2d~37; .. 
[119P.2d752], and Irvine v. Sacramento, ~tc. Dr.(l/t1tag~ ])1.St.;. 
49' Ca1.App.2d 707 [122 P.2d 320]. Th~se_ c~ses,w,hichtend· 
to sllPport defendants' position, we:r.:e J;lot ,~~ou~~t to the 
attention of this court by a petition for hearmg, and thus, 
the present case is the first in which we haye been called 
upon to -examine the soundness of the rule enUnciated 
therein. . , 
,There are many cases in whicn declaratory relief has.been 
sanctioned in this state with respect ,to municipal corpora- . 
tions and counties, or agencies thereof.' C(lend,erson v.Oro-
~ille-W~'andotte Irr;Dist., 207 Cal. 215 [277 P: 487] ; Skid~ 
'morev."Oountyof Amador, 7Ca1.2d 37 [59 P.2d 81.&] ;'Villai:n 
v.Oivil Servo Oom., 18 Ca1.2d 851 [117 P.2d 880]; La 
Franchi V. Oity of Santa Rosa, 8 Ca1.2d 331 [65 P.2d 1301, 
1io A.L.R. 639] ; Skalko V. Oity of Sunnyv,zle, 14 Cal.2d213 
[93 P.2d 93] ; Andrews v. Oity of Piedmont, 100Cal.App. 700' 
[281 ~. 78] ; Greenfield V. Bd. of Oity Plan. Oommr~., 6 Cal. 
App.2d 515 [45 P.2d 219] ; cf. Banks V. Oivil Serv~ceOom., 
10Cl;l1.2d 435 [74 P.2d 741]~) The remeiiy has alsobet:!TI. con-
sidered available to such bodies as plainti~s. (See Oity of 
Alturas V. Gloster, 16 Ca1.2d 46 [104 P.2d 810] ; Oity of Oak-
land V. Brock, 8 Ca1.2d 639, 643 [67 P.2d344]; ct. State"ex 
rel. Smrha Y. General Am. Life Ins. O().,. 132 Neb. 520 [272 
N.W. 555].) In the Bayshore case, supra, the Distrjct Court 
of Appeal' held that the action for declaratory relief Which 
.is auth6rized with respect to, "persons" om. Code ofOtvil Pro-
cedure, sections 1060 et seq., should not be interpreted to apply 
to political subdivisions of the state. The ~ourt ~~nced~d that 
its conclusion was in conflict with the cases which :we have 
cited above, but it indicated that those "cases were in error 
because they had not considered the principles of statutory 
construction upon which its conclusion was based. (See ]Jay-
shore Sanitary Dist. V. San Mateo, supra, p. 340.) The con-
flict thus created in the law relating to declaratory judg-
mentS requires us to examine the problem at some length in 
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Code of Civil Procedure, section 1060, which authorizes' 
actions for a declaratory judgment, provides: "Any person, 
interested under a deed, will or other written instrument, or 
under a contract, or who desires a declaration of his rights 
or duties with respect to another . .. may, in cases of ac~ 
tual controversy relating to the legal rights and duties of the 
respective parties, bring an action in the superior court for 
a declaration of his rights and duties in the premises. . . . " 
[2] In the Bayshore case, supra, after noting that the sta-
tute authorizes the bringing of such an action by one "per-
son" against "another" person, the court relied upon a gen-
eral doctrine of statutory construction in concluding that the 
word "person" should not be held to include any political 
subdivision of the state in the absence of an express indica-
tion that such was the legislative intent. This general rule 
of statutory construction, which is supported by numerous 
cases, is founded upon the principle that statutory 1anguage 
should not be interpreted to apply to agencies of government, 
in the absence of a specific expression of legislative intent, 
where the result of such a construction would be to infringe 
sovereign governmental powers. (See Butterworth v. Boyd, 
12 Ca1.2d 140,150 [82 P.2d 434, 126 A.L.R. 838] ; Balthasar 
v. Pacific Elec. Ry. Co., 187 Cal. 302, 305-308 [202 P. 37, 19 
A.L.R. 452] ; Bayshore Sanitary Dist. v. San Mateo, supra, 
p. 339, and cases cited therein; 23 Cal.Jur. 625 et seq.) 
Where, however, no impairment of sovereign powers would 
result, the reason underlying this rule of construction ceaSes 
to exist and the Legislature may properly be held to have 
intended that the statute apply to governmental bodies evell 
though it used general statutory language only. (See State 
of Calif. v. Marin Mun. W. Dist., 17 Ca1.2d 699, 704 [111 
P.2d 651]. [lb] For reasons set forth hereafter we think that 
the latter rule is the one which applies under the facts of 
the present case. ' 
[3] The practical construction which this statute has re-
ceived since its enactment in 1921, as is indicated by cases 
heretofore cited, has sanctioned the use of declaratory judg-
ment procedure where political subdivisions of the state were 
involved. The practice' thus established is entitled to consid-
eration and should not be overturned unless clearly unsup-
portable. (Cf. Golden Gate Bridge, etc. Dist. v. Felt, 214 Cal. 
308 [5 P.2d 585] ; see (1942) 30 Cal.L.Rev. 682, 685.) 
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[le1 It has been held repeatedly ~hat,actions, for declar~ 
,tory relief involve matters of practlce andJ;r:oc~d~re.onl! 
arid are riot intended in any way to enlarge the JurIsdIctlon ot 
courts over parties and subject-malter. (Cf,Aetna:Life Ins. 
Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240 [57 S.Ct. 461,81 L,Ed, 
611, 108 A.L.R. 10001; Nashville, etc. Ry. v. Wallace, 288 
U,S. 249, 264 [53 S.Ct. 345, 77 L.Ed. 730], Guaranty Trust 
'Co. of New York v. Hannay, (1915) 2E;.B. 536, 563; see An-
derson, Declaratory Judgments (1940), p. 206; Borchard., 
DeclaratoryJudgments (2ded. 1941), p. 231.) suc~ st~!~tes 
are intended to provide an additional procedure .for utlhzlllg 
the existing jurisdiction of the courts. Similarly, it has been 
pointed out that this procedure .is n?tinte~de~ to alter or 
modify the principles of sovereIgn, Immunr~y m any ~ay. 
Declaratory judgment statutes do not authorIze a determma-
tion of liability against the sovereign ,outside the, te~ms of 
statutory provisions accepting liability and subJectIOn to 
suit. (See Borchard, op. cit., supra, pp. 373-374.) Where ~o;­
ernmental bodies are already subject to suit, however, It IS 
clear that procedural statutes may be made applicable to such 
bodies without causing any interference with rights of sov-
ereignty. (Cf. Superior Oil Co. v. Superior.C01J'~t,6 Ca1.2d 
113, 118 [56 P.2d 9501.) If an accepta~c~ of hab;hty aIldsu.b-
jeGtion to suit on the part of a sovereIgn body Is cfound. else-
where in the statutes of the state and the, declaratory Judg-
rnent procedure is not barred by the provisioris.of!he waiver 
or immunity, we think it clear that a dtltermmatIOn of the 
legal issue in. an action for declaratory relief i~ no way con-
,stitutes an impairment of governmentalso,,"ereIgnty. 
Insofaras c municipal corporations axe concerned, no In-
cfringernent of sovereignty results from·. the. fact th~t they 
"m,ay be compelled to answer as defend,~nts .m a~ aetlOnfo~, 
declaratory relief. Municipal corporatIOns ,Ill thlS.state ar~ 
generally empowered to sue andbe .sne~, eitger,by th~ ,pro-
visions of the Municipal InGorpQratlon, Ac~ or by prOVISHm 
·of charte~. (Of. Stats, 1883, p.93, Deering's Ge,Il~]jaws,}937, 
A<it ,5233, §§ 19, 300, 500, 600, 750,850;~os Angeles Char~er 
(1937) ,art. I, § 2 (2), Stats. 1925, p. 1028; 18 Oal.Jur. 112~~ 
1122.) This subjection to suit does not, of course, constitu~e 
an acceptance of liability in all situations in. \Vh~ch .i~di~idual 
defendants may be liable, and .the extept of h~hlhty IS (le~ 
. pendent upon statutes governing particular 'situationS. (See 
• 
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'Douglas~ :. O#y of L~sAng?.les,5·Cal:2d i23,:131 [531>.2-4 
353]) SInce the,declarat~rYJ~dgment statute d,eals "\Vith pr9:'; 
c~dure only, h?we,:er" there IS no reason why the sta.tute 
s?ouid not be mte:tpreted. SQ a* to authorize .thedete'rmina~' 
tI~n by th.atproced~~: of any issue which might be deter-
nunIed aga~ns~ a .mlinICrpal corporation in im ordinary acti~n 
atawor meqUIty. " ' 
, In the recent case of Otis v. Oity of Los Angeles; 52 Cal. 
~pp.2d 605 [126 P.2d,,954], where the court reache'd a" "-< liar con I .' . f " ' , slm-
, ' ~ USIOn mao ar as muniCipal, (lorporations. were con-
cerned, It was sugge!lt~~ thata distinction might be made 
between sU,ch corporatl,ons, and ('ountl'e's ,'T' h' e I' f, 'f th ' ' " , " , n erence 0 
so e court wa~, of cQ~rse, that the Bayshore rule might be 
, und as apP.hed to coun~~ governments, even though it coUld. 
;ot be app~le~ t~ mu.n!cIP~l corporations. No sol:l1).d basis, 
or. such adlStmctIOneXlstsm80rar as actions fordecIara~ory 
relie~ are concerned: From an early date our statutes' hav~ 
,pro~lded ,that counties, are to be treated as corporate bodieS 
haVIng power to sue and be sued. (Pol. Code, §§ 4000 4003 
;Stats.. 1854, p. 45.) ~ is the case with municip~l cor: ' 
" pOl,'a~IP:lls, therefore, no infringement of sovereignty eanbe 
, }lredicated upon the fact that counties may be ca.lled u ',', 
to defend themselyes in court. The application to such bo~?n o~~he procedur~, fOI;declaratoryjudgment merely mak: 
, avall~ble,an addltlo, nal method ,of determining issues of I'a' 
relatmg to co t ' ,',' .' ,w ; , " un y. g~vefUments. Such Issues are Often deter-
,~,med at present Inactl?~,,:here counties appear as patties 
defend~t. (Cf. Sou~hern Oalif. Roaas 00. v. San Luis Obis' (j , 
Oounty,4 OaL2d 220 [48 P.2d M] ; Oolusa Oounty v. Gle~n 
, (Jo'lJ,nty, 117 Cal. 434, 436 [49 P. 457]' Price v 0 t 
,SaC?rament?, ~,Cal. 254; see 7 Ca1.Jur.' 556.) Sinceo~~eY d~ 
cl{lratory Jud~~nt.p:ocedur~ can not be interpreted so as' 
~o ext,e~d the JurIsdICtIOn of, the courts or broaden th" l' b'l 
Ity whIch ' b' d ' e Ia 1-
, ," ,may e ~~pose, upon governmental bodies, no im-
~~~m~~t of ~?~ereignty will result from interpreting the 
. d perso~, m Code of Ci~i! Procedure, section 1060, to 
lUc!Ude countj.es as well as mUnICIpal corporations. The U 't d 
States Supr' C ' t 'd" ," "nI e , 
,', .eme our sal m a recent case; comm~nting u on 
the suggestion that the word "person" could " '. l'dP , " " never mc u e a, 
gover~mental body, .... 'there is no hard and fast rule of 
, ex~luslO~. The purpose" subJect matter, the context the Ie is-
latIve history, and the executive interpretation6f. the stat~te 
Dec. 19421 HOYT V.BOARD OF CIVIL SERVICECOYMBS;' ,405 
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areaid$to' construction whichmayin~ic~te,a~ irit~n.t",by US~ ()£, tl,le ter:dt, to bring state or naJiop: 'V~thip: thes,~op.eo~JJie 
law'/" (.Georgi<L v.Evans, 316 U.S.15~ [62S.0~. 972,974, 
'S6'L.Ed.1346] see; also, United Sta;te~y.'Oooper(Jorp;, 31~ 
U.S. 600, ~o~ l6'~ KOt. 742" 85,:t..E!1.~,1071].). ".,',:. 
,.'The concluSion, reached here;,n is, hot incOl;\Siste~twith.th~ 
.line6f cases,cited in Ba1Jshor~ Sanitary 'J){st,~'~:$dn, 'M4teo~ )'uprd. III the cases, there relied 'l1Ppn! ~e~er81, statutes w~l'~ S011g:lit't~be applied against goverrun~:n.taLb6die",wh.er~, A Cl~:ai'hliasion of ~overeignty woulq. .hav~ ,r~~1i1te.d. ,Thu£!i ,if!: 
'Whittakerv. Oounty of Tuolumne,96',Cal~ ~on [?dJ?,101.~l; 
-the' plaintiff attempted to uti1~e.the"proyisions:olC6deo~ , Ciyill;>ro'c~dure, section 1050, to a:djndic~~eCfl?,est~i>nsPl~ol'v:~ 
ing, the existence arid' extent 'of a, moneyiiabHitiaSserted by' 
the countj t6 be due it under atux'E\ts,tute.,lxl other cases ari 
,a;ttempt waS made to utilize genetaLstatu~o:rY,pr~vielions in 
order to adjudicate the iss'tie' of title 'to' la:ri~ where govern-
mentalbodie$were involve,d.(O( Newoo;mb v,, Oity ol'New. 
port Beach, 7 Cal.2d393, 404[60 P,2d, 825]; Berton v. All 
Persons, '176 Cal. 610, 617 [l70P. ,1511; State v: RoyaZ Oon-
solidated Mining 00., 187 Cal. 343, 346[202 P~; 1331-) The, 
holding: tha.t such' statutes could not be utilized against sov-· 
ereign bodies in the absence of a; specific expression of legis-, 
iatfve intent is consistent with the prmciples set forth herein. 
,A different rule is" a:pplicab~e in the present cas~ ,becauSe riQ 
(invasion of,,~overeignty is involved. Insofat,as 'the cases ,Qf Bay~koreSdnitary ]Jist. v. San Mateo, supra,apd'Jrvinev. 
Sacramento, etc. Drainage Dist.,supra, arecontl'a;ry to'the 
,concluSions expressed hereiIl, those cases -are hereby, disall-
proved. The present action, for declaratory relief was ~ti~ 
,tuted to obtain an interpretation of the Los Angeles Chartat' 
and does not impose liability of any kind lipon the city. The 
action is onewllich can prop.erlybe maintained; therefore;' 
under. the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure, section 
·1060 etseq. ' ,-, ,
, [4] This action, which was tried upon stipulated facts, 
involves the construction to be placed upon section 125(b) 
of the Los Angeles City Charter, which became effective on 
May 15, 1933. That section provides : "'in addition to all. other 
matters, the board l of civil service commissioners] shall bi ~ts rules provide for: . . . (b) The establishment in each 
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division: established ii! I:lnd by adep3:rtment having contr6f 
of ,definite revenues and funds of a reserve list which shalt 
consist of the names of those persons who have been thereto-
fore regUlarly appointed to, and have served beyond the pro-
bationary period in OJ;' have been regularly promoted to a posi-
tion in such class and have been suspended from their posi-
tions since January 1, 1921:], for causes other than personal 
delinquency, whether for lack of funds, lack of work, abolish-
ment of position or otherwise; provided, that any person in 
the classified civil service who hits served therein since Janu-
ary 1, 1928, and was suspended for causes other than for, per-
sonal delinquency, shall be entitled upon his written .request 
therefor, to have. his nallle placed upon the reserve list in each 
such class-group in which he was regularly appointed and 
served beyond the p~riodof probation and from which class 
he was. suspended prior to Ja;nuary 1, 1928. Each person 
whose name appears on the reserve list, until regularly re-
stored toa position in his class ... shall be certified for ap-
pointment, as in this section provided for, to a position in his 
class . . . ; provided, that after this section takes effect, the 
name of any person, except as in this section provided lor, 
. who has been out of the service of the city for more than five 
years shall be permanently stricken from the reserve list by 
the board. [Italics ours] ... " In the exercise of the rule 
ma~ing power conferred upon it by this section, the board 
adopted rUle XIX, section 3, providing: "Names of persons 
shall be stricken from the reserve or reemployment lists when 
said persons have been out of the employ of the City five (5) 
years." 
Plaintiffs were appointed to positions in the office of the 
city engineer prior to 1926 and were suspended from employ-
ment in 1932 by reason of lack of work, lack of funds and 
abolishment of positions. Under the provisions of se~tion 
125 (b) of the charter, plaintiffs automatically became en-
titled to positions upon the reserve list since they were sus-
pended from their. employment for reasons other than per-
sonal delinquency " since January 1, 1928." In 1937 the de-
fendant commission, acting,under its interpretation of the 
charter provision, set forth '!'ibove, struck the name. of' each of 
the plaintiffs from the reserve list and ~h~reafter· refused to 
restore plaintiffs' names to the list. Plaintiffs contend that the 
defen!iant,board had,;no authority to striketheirnaDles from 
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. the reserve liElt, and that the rule adopted by the board is not 
consistent with the provisions of the charter. . '. 
. The. problem involved concerns the interpretation" to b,e 
placed upon the five-year period prescribed by the charter 
during which suspended employees are to be ri;laiIitain.edon· a 
reserve list. The position of the Board. of Civil Service. Com-
missioners is indicated by the action taken m this case, and 
the rUle adopted by it. Plaintiffs contend that the. :five~year 
limitation should not be given any operative effect· whatever 
prior to the date· the charter provision became .. effective, that 
is, May 15, 1933: and that any employee of the city who was 
suspended for causes other than. personal delinquency. prior 
to May 15, 1933 (whether before or after January 1, 1~28).i!l 
entitled to remain on a reserve list 'indefinitely,'i>r until reap" 
pointment to a position in his class,' Since plaintiffs were sus~. 
pended in 1932, they argue that the five-year Ilniitation does 
not apply to them and that· they are stillentitled to a position 
. 'on the reserve list of· their respective departments. Defendants 
point out the unreasonable consequences which would follow· 
from such an interpretation of the charter provision. Thus. 
piaintiffs apparently assert their right to remain on the' re~ 
serve lists indefinitely, whereas an employee suspended 
slightly over a year thereafter would be automatically. re-
moved from the reserve list at the e:x;piration of the five-year 
period. In this connection it should be noted . that plaintiffs' 
chief ground for attack upon. the iriterpretation adopted by 
thebo'ard is that it produces illogicar resUlts. The trial court 
held that the action of the Board of Civil Service. Commis-
sioners was legally taken in accordance with the contempoJ;'a-
neous administrative construction of ·section 125 (b) which 
was consistently followed thereafter. . 
Decisions in this state and elsewhere have recognized that, 
although the courts will ordinarily follow a contemporaneoUs 
ad:ministrative construction of a statute which is' reasonably 
susceptible of more than one interpretation, such a construc~ 
tion cannot be followed where it is clearly erroneous. (See 
Bodinson Mfg. 00. v. Oalifornia E. (Jom., 17 Cal.2d 321, 
326 [109 P.2d 935] ; People,!. S()uth~r:n "faci/ic 00.,209 Cal. 
5.7.8,594, 595 [290 P. 25]; pil,eYV.,Tk()inipsQrt, 193. citi~ 772, 
778 [227P. 772] ; Hodge v. M'cOall,lS5;Cal. 330. [1~,7 P. S6]; 
United States v. Philbrick. 120U:S. 52, 59 [7 S.Ot. ~1~,3'{) 
L.Ed 559].) Plaintiffs' contention, which was rejected br the 
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trial court, is that the provisions of section 125 (b) . of the 
Charter are violated by the administrative constructi~n pla~ed 
upon it, and that the interpretation of the boar.dcannot be 
followed. The interpretation suggested by plaintiffs, how." 
. eyer, does not seem to us 'tQQe so clearly cor:r,:ect, and ~hat of 
the boar4 so clearly wrong, that we are willing todep,art from 
the administrative conStruction which has been applied con~ 
sistently in these cases since the enactment of the charter 
provision. '. .' , 
In seeking to prove that the administrative construction 
adopted by the board is wrong, plaintiffs rely! qpontwQ 
phrases in sect~on 125 (b). The first is the, provision that 
"after this s~ction takes effect" the name of any persQn who, 
has been out of the service of the city for morethan ~y~ y~a~s' 
must be struck from the reserve list. Plaintiffs. arg:qe that, 
the phrase "after this section takeseffect"'sho:uld -be inter-
preted to relate to the entire provision for a fiye,-yearperiod, 
of limitation. This conclusion does not foIIow from ,the gran:l~ 
matical construction' of the charter provisioh which is' ~us-' 
ceptjble of the interpretation that it is the striking of the 
employee's name which is to take place a:fter the section :be~ 
comes effective. Plaintiffs' conclusion. is based, rather~' upon 
the illogical results 'wlJ.iclJ. ares'aidt<> follow from such an in-
terpretation. Thus,.it is contended, an employee who wa~ sus-
pended prior to May 15, 1928 (and was thus automaticaIIy 
entitled to a position oli the reserve list under'section 12jj(b) ), ' 
would have his name struck from the reserve list the d~y ,after 
the charter provision became effective On May 15, 1933 .. It 
may be conceded that it would serve no usefu.l, p'Q.tpose to ' 
put an employee's name on a reserve list oneday,oIiiy ,to 
have it struck therefrom the next, but we donotiigt';ee that 
such a result compels the conclusion which plaintiffs advanCe. 
Plaintiffs' interpretation, which requires th~t,anyemployee 
'suspended before May 15, 1933, be entitled to ,Ii position 'on, 
the ,reserve list indefinitely, seems to us>far m.ore'unreason~ 
able than the results which fplIow from the interpretat~on of 
the board. Furthermore, it must be borne in mind that under 
the rules of the bo~rd whiclJ. existed prior to i933, a reserve 
.list was maintained upon which employees were permitted to '. 
remain for a five-year period~ Thus, any employee whose name 
was subject to being struck from the list within Some shorter. 
period than five years after May 15, 1933, had already main-
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tained a poSition upon a reserve list for the first porlion of 
the five-year period under the older r:ules., . .' .. 
, 'The second, phrase in section 125 (b) upon WhICh: plamtiffs 
place reliance is the exception to the operati9nof the fiv:~~ 
year limitation. The charter provision'states: H : •• the 
naine of any person, except as in this,s~ction prl?'IJ~ded torf 
who bas been out. of the service of the city for more than five. 
years shall be permanently stricken.from.,the rese:r,:ye list}~,r, 
the board. . . ." It i~' plaintiffs' po.sition ~hat some mearung 
mq,St be given to thisexception~ril:l that~~e only'pos$i~le 
meining .is that' the 'persons, specifically m~ntIoned msection 
'12$(1)) were interiqed to be excepted" that IS, th~se sus~~nded 
priorto'Janu.ary 1, 1928, who work~d for'th,e CIty: t~erel:!:fter", 
, and ·those suspended a:fterJ anuary 1,', ~9~8", b~t' before ~he 
charter provision ,became effective. This restilts m exeml?tmg 
:from the five-y~ar period of limitation all ,city'emploreeswho, 
were suspended for causes other than" person~l . delInquency 
:prior to the effective date of the charter proVlslo~. The un-
reasonable consequences of this interpretation have already 
been referred to, but plaintiffs cOlltend that Ilo'<i~her result, 
is possible if any meaning w~atever is, to beascnbed t? the 
exception here involved. We find no suc~unfortu;t~te co~pUl­
slonhowever for the exception can be gIVen meanIng Wlt~out 
foUdwing pl~intiffs' argument t? ' ... it$ ,~timat~;'. conclusion., 
Thus; ,under the language, of $ectlOn ,125,(b) ,a. CIty' ~m,ploy'e~ 
suspended "foJ:' causes other than personal deh~~u.ency~rlOr 
to January 1, 1928, would be,entitledto a poslt~on upoh th,e 
reserve Jist if :he so requested and if he served In, the Cla,sSI-
fiedcivil service after January 1, )928: If, forexample,~nich 
an 'employee 'weresusperided in 1926, remaine~ ,out of the 
service of the citY-for six years and thellserved In th,e ~las!!l~­
fled civil $ervicefor a brief period in 1933, he 'Wp~d h.e e?,~, 
titled to remain upon the r,eserve Hstfor.a full perl04, of fi:e 
years and his name' could not be struck fr?m the J~st ~le~pl,te 
the fact that he had been out of the servIce of the ,CIty for 
'more than five years ,between 1~26and ~932. The language 
i 'except as in this section provided ~or"ha:s the'eff~ctof 
preserving· fpr such an employee' the mtend~d protectIon of 
the provision, that is, the maintenance of hIS nam~ upon a 
reserve list for a five-year period after the date of hIS last 
service for the city. 
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~ect in following the adrninistrativeinterpretation placed' 
upon ,section 125(b). Plaintiffs' additional,reql1eStfor a de.' 
claration that the board is 'under a duty to restoretheril to 
the register of eJigibles for the positions from which they wer~ 
sl1spended need not be, considered at length. Since'we have 
held that plaintiffs w~r'e hiwfullyseparated from' the service 
of the city by the striking of their names frorntherese~ve 
list, it follows that, they, cannot assert a right at the' present 
time to be restored to the· register of eligibles hi view, of rule 
XII of the board, adopted pursuant to section 110 pf the 
Charter. Section 3 of that rule provides : "The name of any 
-rerson who has been sepatated from the.service of the city 
for more than three years, shall not be resJored to the Register 
of Eligibles." ' 
The judgment is affirmed. 
Shenk, J., Curtis,J" Edmonds, J., and Carter, J., con-
curred. 
TRAYNOR, J.-I concur in the judgment. In my opinion 
the applicability of an act of the legislature to the state or its 
political subdivisions presents a question in each, case of leg-
islative intent rather than infringement of sovereignty. (state 
of California v. Marin Municipal Water District, 17Ca1.2d 
699, 704 [111 P.2d651].) In determining that intent, there' 
is, as the court stated in Georgia v. Evans, 316 U.S. 159 
[62 S.Ot. 972, 86 L.Ed. 1346], no hard and fast rule but 
there are several aids to construction~ The SIgnificant facts 
that are aids to construction in the 'present case are: under 
s~ate statutes and the charter of the city of Los Angeles the 
CItY. ca~ sue and be sued in cases of this kind in ordinary 
actIOns In law or equity subject to the provisions of the Code 
of Civil Procedure governing such actions; no charter or 
other provision expressly or impliedly precludes the deter-
mination of issues such as those here involved under the de-
Claratory judgment procedure provided in section 1060 of 
that code; the numerous cases in which declaratory relief 
has been invoked by and against municipal corporations have 
established a practice that must be given great weight in the 
interpretation of the act. 
", 
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[L. A. No: 18387. In Bank. Dec. 23, 194~.] , '.i 
MEDICO-DENTAL BUILDING COMPANY O,F LOS' AN~ 
GELES (a Cprporation) , Appimant,v. HORTON, ~ 
CONVERSE (a Corporation), Respon:dent. ' -
[1] Landlord and Tenant-Leases-Natllre . ...,.While a lease is a 
con'veyanc~in that it transfers an estate to~thelessee;jt also 
presents' the aspect of a contract. This dual character c~e­
ates two distinct sets of rig,hts and,obligations-onecompns-
ing those growing out of therelat,ionof landlord an:~ ten~ 
ant, and the other, those growing out of the eXI>ressst~pula-
tions of the lease and based on privity of contract. , ,i 
[2] Id.-Leases-Interpretation: Breach of Covenant&..-Construc-
tion.'-Those features of a lease which arest:rictlycontra~tual 
in nature should be construed according to the l"llles ~Qrt~e 
interpretation of contracts generally ,and, in confOrmity with 
the fundamental principle that the intentions of the~ P!lrties 
should, be given effect so far as possible. A!lcor~ir,tgly,cov~ 
riants and .stipUlations on the part of the lessor an,d,lessee are 
to be con$trued to be dependent upon, or independent{)f, each 
other according to the intention' of the parties and' the, good 
sense' of the case; technical words shouid give ,way to such in-
tention. 
[3a, 3b] Id.-:-Breach of Covenant-Constru6tion-:-As, Depen4ent.-
The correlation of the several provisionsofa lease of prem-
ises for a drug store, plainly indicating the intention and under-
standing of the parties as to the interbalancing considerations 
existing between the various covenants,' With, the ,fact thl!.t 
the exclusive right to conduct a drug storein the building was 
vital to the lessee's successful operation of its business, com-
pelled, the conclusion that a restrictivecovcnant 'of the'lessor 
"not to lease" any other part of the building for use as a drug 
store was not incidental or subordinate to, the mil-in object' of 
[2] See 15 Ca1.Jur. 625; 32 Am.Jur. 145. 
[3] See 7Ca1.Jur. 717, 718. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Landlord and Tenant, § 22; [2] Land-
lord ~nd Tenant, §§ 36, 214; [3] Landlord and Tenant, § 214; [4] 
Contraets, §184; [5,8,9,13] Landlord and Tenant, § 212; [6,15] 
Landlord and Tenant, § 258(2); [7] Drugs, § 1; [10] ·Contracts, 
§ 161; [11] Landlord and Tenant, § 257; [12] Waiver; §5; [14] 
Landlord and Tenant, § 49. 
